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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a school monitor at a public high school. Your
spouse is suffering from a severe illness and in order to care for him or her,
you can only work at the school part-time. One day, your spouse’s
condition worsens, and the deputy superintendent of the school informs you
that you may take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”) to care for your spouse. Unbeknownst to both of you, you are
not technically eligible for such leave. Relying on this assurance, you take
what you believe to be FMLA leave in order to care for your ailing spouse.
Thereafter, you are so grateful to the deputy superintendent for his
generosity that you write him a note thanking him for allowing you to take
FMLA leave. Because of your spouse’s health difficulties, you have to take
leave intermittently over the next several months and are repeatedly assured
by officials within your school district that you are covered under FMLA.
Tragically, after battling for months, your spouse succumbs to his or her
illness. Concerned about your absence from work, you contact the school
1
Research Editor 2010–2011, Staff Writer 2009–2010, University of Dayton Law Review; B.A.
Centre College. I would like to thank my brother Brian Borchers for lending his mastery of the English
language to this comment. I would also like to thank my girlfriend Liz Forster for her love and support.

Published by eCommons, 2010

364

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

and are assured that you can take as much time as needed before returning to
work; in fact, the deputy superintendent himself assures you that there is
nothing to worry about. Then, with the grief of your spouse’s passing still
raw, you receive a telephone call from the school and are informed that your
employment is terminated effective immediately. Thereafter, school district
officials inform you that you were in fact never eligible for FMLA leave and
have no viable claim under the statute.
This unjust factual scenario may seem farfetched but, unfortunately,
it is all too real.2 Since the passage of the FMLA in 1993, both private and
public employees across this country have struggled to prevent employers
from arguing that they were not eligible for leave, even though they were
given affirmative misrepresentations to the contrary.3 Employees trust their
employers to give them accurate guidance regarding leave. However, when
employers make mistakes, it is the employees who suffer the adverse
consequences.4
Recently, private employees have successfully employed equitable
estoppel as a common law defense to a claim of FMLA ineligibility.5
Indeed, the implementation of equitable estoppel may be a crude remedy to
put public employees on equal footing with their private sector peers.6
However, in factual scenarios similar to the one above, equitable estoppel
was an effective shield to a private employer’s claim of ineligibility.7
Unfortunately, because of the age-old rule prohibiting estoppel of
the government, the argument has failed public employees in FMLA
eligibility disputes.8 Even in sympathetic cases, like the aforementioned
one, courts have been extremely reluctant to apply estoppel against the
government.9 Although the United States Supreme Court has never allowed
an equitable estoppel claim against the government to proceed, it has opined
that the doctrine may be applied when governmental interests are
outweighed by standards of decency and fairness.10 The hesitancy of courts
to permit use of equitable estoppel as against the government has put public
employees on an uneven playing field with their peers in the private sector
with regard to seeking redress for relying on assurance of FMLA eligibility.

2

See Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough Reg’l Sch. Dist., 576 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2009).
See, e.g., id. (finding against public employee despite employer’s misrepresentations about her
FMLA eligibility); Minard v. ITC Deltacom Commc’ns, Inc., 447 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding
that a private employer made misrepresentations about an employee’s FMLA eligibility).
4
See generally Nagle, 576 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009) (an employee was terminated after her
supervisor’s misrepresentations led her to take FMLA leave when she was not eligible to take it).
5
Minard, 477 F.3d at 359.
6
Nagle, 576 F.3d at 4-5.
7
Minard, 447 F.3d at 358.
8
See Nagle, 576 F.3d at 6; see also Austin v. Winter, 286 F. App’x 31, 37 (4th Cir. 2008).
9
Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1984).
10
See id.
3
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Therefore, it is essential that stronger administrative solutions are
enacted to provide a remedy for public employees in FMLA eligibility
disputes. One possible solution is implementing federal regulations to allow
for the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, even though recent
regulations that attempted to do so were struck down by courts.11 Hence, if
Congress or the Department of Labor (“DOL”) is unwilling to explicitly
create such a safeguard, it will be up to the courts to re-examine the use of
equitable estoppel against the government in this context, because public
employees are entitled to the same level of protection under the FMLA as
private employees.
Section II of this comment briefly explains the policy aims of the
FMLA and the DOL’s regulatory attempts to implement those goals. In
addition, this section traces the historical development of the use of
equitable estoppel against the government, the recent history surrounding
the use of equitable estoppel in FMLA eligibility cases, and the
development of two very different standards for its use when applied by
governmental employees as opposed to those in the private sector.
Section III of this comment argues that it is necessary for Congress
and/or the DOL to enact a solution to this notice/eligibility problem. More
specifically, the solution must protect wronged employees asserting FMLA
interference or retaliation claims who reasonably relied on the employers’
misrepresentations. This section will also argue that such an administrative
solution, though preferable, is unlikely. Therefore, this section primarily
focuses on why courts should allow public employees to use equitable
estoppel as a shield to an eligibility defense.
II. BACKGROUND
The background section of this comment will focus on the general
policy aims of the FMLA, illustrating the unique nature of the statute. Then,
the focus will shift to the history of equitable estoppel, how that common
law doctrine has been used in FMLA eligibility disputes with private
employers, and why the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes public
employees from using it in this context. Next, it will address the failure of
the DOL to address the problem of misrepresentations by employers to
employees regarding eligibility with substantive regulations. Finally, the
last section will address the DOL’s newly enacted regulation that may or
may not solve the problem at hand.

11

See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 67,942-43 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 825).
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A. Policy Aims of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 199312
The FMLA was enacted “to balance the demands of the workplace
with the needs of families, to promote the stability and economic security of
families, and to promote national interests in preserving family integrity.”13
The FMLA allows “eligible employees of covered employers to take up to a
total of twelve weeks of unpaid leave during a twelve month period” for a
variety of reasons.14 If an employee’s FMLA rights are violated, he or she
may file a complaint with the DOL or institute a private action in federal or
state court.15 Prior to the enactment of the FMLA, leave determinations
were left to the discretion of individual employers. This resulted in great
inconsistencies regarding when leave was allowed and when it was not.16
As a result, approximately 150,000 Americans lost their jobs annually
because their companies had no leave benefits.17
The FMLA was also enacted to address the modern reality that both
parents are employed full-time in many households.18 Additionally,
lawmakers recognized the increasing commonality of the single-parent
home,19 which was that two-thirds of women with young children worked,20
and that “one out of every five American workers has some responsibility
for an older parent or relative.”21 However, Republican opposition to the
federal legislation was palpable because “[ninety-three] percent of small
businesses already offer[ed] such leave.”22 In fact, one Congresswoman
stated, “[b]y passing this bill, Congress will put people out of work, cause
the loss of other benefits, and take away benefit choice from employers and
employees—just to mandate a benefit that not all employees can afford to
take advantage of.”23
Even though the private sector had slowly begun to adjust to the
changes in the workforce, “Congress passed the FMLA [to] fill in the gaps
and provide a national minimum standard for employers to meet with
12
For a more in depth look at the FMLA, see WILL AITCHISON, THE FMLA: UNDERSTANDING THE
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (2003).
13
29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (2006).
14
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 7,876, 7,876 (Feb. 11, 2008) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 825).
15
Id.
16
LINDA LEVINE, EXPLANATION OF AND EXPERIENCE UNDER THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE
ACT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 2 (2009) available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/
key_workplace/197; see also ELLEN GALINSKY, ET AL., NATIONAL STUDY OF EMPLOYERS 2008,
FAMILIES AND WORK INSTITUTE (2008), available at http://familiesandwork.org/site/research/reports/
2008nse.pdf.
17
139 CONG. REC. H366 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Gordon).
18
LEVINE, supra note 16, at 1.
19
Caitlyn M. Campbell, Overstepping One’s Bounds: The Department of Labor and the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1077, 1079 (2004) (citing S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 5-6 (1993)).
20
139 CONG. REC. H366 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Gordon).
21
Id.
22
139 CONG. REC. H367 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Quillen).
23
139 CONG. REC. H396 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Grams); see also 139 CONG.
REC. S10362 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1993) (statement of Mrs. Kassebaum).
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regards to leave.”24 Although the statute maintained minimal federal
requirements, employers were still encouraged to provide more liberal leave
policies than those minimum requirements.25 The statute also empowered
the DOL to enact regulations “necessary to carry out” the FMLA.26 Armed
with a grant of rulemaking authority from Congress, the DOL passed
substantive regulations intended to assist in implementation of the law in
1995.27 For the most part, those regulations remained unchanged until the
DOL revised them in 2009.28 In preparation for the revisions to the new
regulations, the DOL solicited and received over 2,500 comments on the
proposed changes.29 The newly revised regulations became effective in
January of 2009.30
After more than fifteen years in existence, the law has been met
with both praise and criticism.31 Its supporters have generally lauded the
reality that the statute allows troubled employees to take time off for a
serious illness, or to care for a family member, without having to quit or
worry about losing their jobs.32 On the other hand, FMLA detractors have
leveled the following criticisms: (a) the law’s high cost to employers; (b)
many employees cannot afford to take unpaid leave; and (c) the sometimes
ambiguous language of the law and its accompanying regulations.33 To its
credit, the DOL recognized that the regulations used to “fill in the gaps” of

24
25
26
27

Campbell, supra note 19, at 1079.
See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 84 (2002).
29 U.S.C. § 2654 (2006).
See generally 29 C.F.R. pt. 825 (1995) (for the codification of the Family and Medical Leave

Act).

28

29 C.F.R. § 825 (2009).
Ashley Hawley, Taking a Step Forward or Backward? The 2009 Revisions to the FMLA
Regulations, 25 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 137, 138 (Spring 2010). For an in-depth look at the DOL’s
notice of proposed rulemaking, see Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 7,876 (Feb. 11,
2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 825). Subsequently, the DOL issued its notice of final rules, which
contained an in-depth explanation of the purpose and reasoning behind the changes. Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 825).
30
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. at 67,934. See generally Darrell
VanDeusen and Kelly Hoelzer, VanDeusen and Hoelzer on the DOL’s Final FMLA Regulations, 2008
EMERGING ISSUES 3194 (2008) (generally analyzing the changes to the DOL’s FMLA regulations).
31
See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 19, at 1100; see also Katherine Reynolds Lewis, Workers
Cheated Out of Time Off, Report Says: Unpaid Leave Law is Difficult to Read, THE STAR LEDGER, June
22, 2008, at Bus. 1. But see, e.g., Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, Letter to the Editor, Another View of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2008, at A9 (arguing that the FMLA is not as
unfriendly to employees as its critics contend).
32
Diane Cadrain, Noble Headache: The Family and Medical Leave Act Achieves a High Purpose- at a Price, HR MAG., July 1, 2008 at 54; see also Patricia Wilson, Clinton Expands Family Leave for
Federal Workers, REUTERS NEWS, Apr. 12, 1997.
33
See Judith L. Lichtman, Many Can’t Afford to Take Family Leave, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER,
Sept. 8, 1999 at 9B; see also Heather Boushey, A Family-Leave Safety Net, AM. PROSPECT, June 2009 at
27; Carrie Mason-Draffen, Can They Do That?, CHI. TRIB., July 23, 2006 at Bus. 8; Lily Garcia, When
Your Supervisor Wants a Doctor’s Note Every Time, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2008 at K01; Amy Joyce,
Too Often, Family Leave Leaves Much to be Desired, WASH POST, Aug. 27, 2006 at F01; Priya Ganapati,
FMLA Costs Hit $21 Billion in 2004, INC. (Apr. 28, 2005), http://www.inc.com/news/articles/
200504/fmlastudy.html; Carl C. Bosland, FMLA Verdict Could Cost Chase Manhattan Over $8 Million,
FMLA BLOG (Apr. 3, 2008), http://federalfmla.typepad.com/fmla_blog/damages.
29
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the Act needed to be revised.34
More specifically, the notice requirements of the statute have caused
conflict, especially as interpreted and applied by the DOL.35 For example,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that individualized notice
requirements were consistent with the language and aims of the FMLA.36
Disputes over the stringent timing requirements promulgated by the DOL,
however, forced it to attempt balancing an employee’s right to timely and
accurate notice of FMLA leave with an employer’s administrative struggle
to quickly make such a determination.37 Although the DOL has reacted by
instituting and amending regulations, the problem has not been resolved.38
B. Equitable Estoppel
As one commentator stated, “[w]hen the law is against you . . .
counsel should consider equity.”39 Equitable estoppel40 was allegedly
developed from the teachings of Aristotle, with ancient English Chancellors
implementing it in some form.41 The use of equitable estoppel was
predominately limited thereafter to “formal matters of deeds and records”
until the doctrine broadened to include “a variety of conduct and
activities.”42
The doctrine began to take its modern form in the mid-nineteenth
century when a New Hampshire court determined that a misrepresentation
did not need to be malicious if a reasonable person would believe it and act
on it to his or her detriment.43 Most courts today have adopted some version
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which explains:
[i]f one person makes a definite misrepresentation of fact to
another person having reason to believe that the other will
rely upon it and the other in reasonable reliance upon it does
an act . . . the first person is not entitled . . . to regain
property or its value that the other acquired by the act, if the
other in reliance upon the misrepresentation and before
discovery of the truth has so changed his position that it
34
Kris Maher, Is Family Leave Act Too Soft or Too Tough? Workers, Employers Face Off Over
How to Handle the FMLA, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2007 at D1.
35
See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 96 (2002) (invalidating 29
C.F.R. § 825.700(a) (1995)).
36
Downey v. Strain, 510 F.3d 534, 541 (5th Cir. 2007).
37
Dep’t of Labor, Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department of
Labor’s Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 124 (June 28, 2007).
38
See 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(b) (2009) (implementing new notice requirements).
39
T. Leigh Anderson, The Triumph of Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern Litigation, 27 REV.
LITIG. 377, 378 (Spring 2008).
40
See generally 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel & Waiver § 1 (2000) (looking in depth at the history of
estoppel in American law).
41
See id.
42
Anderson, supra note 39, at 385.
43
Horn v. Cole, 51 N.H. 287, 295-96 (1868).
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would be unjust to deprive him of that which he thus
acquired.44
The comment section of the Restatement clarifies that estoppel is
appropriately used even where “the one making the representation believes
his statement is true,” and, “it is immaterial whether the person making the
representation exercised due care in making the statement.”45
However, courts have historically been extremely reluctant to apply
this doctrine to governmental entities.46 This reluctance arose from English
common law concerns that the Crown could not be subject to suit absent its
consent.47 In the United States, this doctrine of sovereign immunity
prevents private individuals from estopping government, except in
extraordinary circumstances.48 As a result, those attempting to hold
government to its word through the use of equitable estoppel face extremely
high hurdles.
1. Equitable Estoppel: FMLA and Private Employers
As previously mentioned, equitable estoppel is an effective tool in
shielding ineligibility defenses in FMLA interference and retaliation
claims.49 Specifically, equitable estoppel prevents an employer from
maintaining an ineligibility defense under the FMLA where: (1) it has made
a misrepresentation of fact with reason to believe its employee will rely
upon it; (2) the employee reasonably relied upon it; and (3) the employee
suffered a detriment as a result.50
One attorney recently cautioned employers to “exercise extreme
care when evaluating whether or not an employee is eligible for FMLA
leave” because a mistaken assurance of coverage “could cost the employer
thousands of dollars in litigation costs” in the future.51 Yet another group of
lawyers warned employers to carefully review their policies on the FMLA
because “[w]hen giving the gift of FMLA leave when not required to do so,

44

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 894(1) (1979).
Id.
46
See P.H. Vartanian, Applicability of Doctrine of Estoppel against Government and its
Governmental Agencies, 1 A.L.R. 2D 338, 1 (2009).
47
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).
48
See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984).
49
See Minard v. ITC Deltacom Commc’ns, Inc., 447 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2006); see also
Dobrowski v. Jay Dee Contractors, Inc., 571 F.3d 551, 557 (6th Cir. 2009); Murphy v. Fed Ex Nat’l.
LTL, Inc., 618 F.3d 893, 899 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Reed v. Lear Corp., 556 F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir.
2009)).
50
Heckler, 476 U.S. at 59; see also Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough Reg’l Sch. Dist., 576 F.3d 1, 6 (1st
Cir. 2009) (citing Mimiya Hosp., Inc. SNF v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 331 F.3d 178, 182
(1st Cir. 2003)).
51
Sean F. Darke, Esq., Is Your Company Inadvertently Extending FMLA Rights? It Could Cost
You!, MIDWEST LAB. & EMP. (Oct. 2009), http://www.w-p.com/CM/Articles/Articles324.asp.
45
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employers have to be prepared to eat the entire Ox, tail and all.”52
Many courts have reached similar conclusions. In Minard v. ITC
Deltacom Communications, Inc., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that summary judgment for an employer was improperly
granted, and that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the employee
would have acted differently had her employer correctly informed her that
she was ineligible for FMLA leave.53 Although Minard’s employer had
granted her request for FMLA leave, the employer subsequently terminated
her employment when it later discovered that she was ineligible under the
50/75 exception.54 The court determined that ITC had made a definite
misrepresentation to Ms. Minard regarding eligibility, and that she
reasonably relied on it.55 On remand, the only question was one of
detriment because a genuine issue existed as to whether Minard could have
delayed her leave for surgery regardless of whether or not it was FMLA
leave.56
Analogous to Minard, in Duty v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants, an
employee was injured at work, and he received a letter guaranteeing him
FMLA leave.57 He relied on the letter, and his employer subsequently
terminated him when the company discovered he was ineligible for FMLA
leave under the law.58 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it estopped the employer
from asserting an eligibility defense because the employer’s “unintentional
misleading behavior caused the employee to justifiably and detrimentally
rely on the FMLA leave.”59
Addressing noticeable discrepancies in previous opinions, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently determined that an employer may be
equitably estopped from denying FMLA coverage if the aforementioned
elements are shown.60 Although the complaining employee in Dobrowski v.
Jay Dee Contractors, Inc. could not show that he detrimentally relied on his
employer’s affirmative misrepresentations regarding eligibility, the court
insinuated that its decision may have been different if he had proved that he
would not have undergone a surgical procedure absent FMLA leave.61 The
52
Matthew T. Deffebach & Brenna Nava, FMLA & Equitable Estoppel, LAW 360 (Aug. 12, 2009),
http://www.haynesboone.com/files/Publication/725025f7-389a-4747-a001-544564c419d9/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/6376fd52-d062-4cc8-af89-609ccd921eab/FMLA_and_Equitable_Estoppel.pdf.
53
Minard, 447 F.3d at 359.
54
Id. at 354 (explaining that FMLA excludes from compliance any employer that employs less than
fifty employees at or within seventy-five miles of the worksite).
55
Id. at 359.
56
Id.
57
Duty v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 293 F.3d 481, 494 (8th Cir. 2002).
58
Id.
59
Id. (citing Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., 274 F.3d 706, 724-25 (2d Cir. 2001)).
60
Dobrowski v. Jay Dee Contractors, 571 F.3d 551, 557 (6th Cir. 2009).
61
Id. at 558.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol36/iss3/9

2011]

AN UNEVEN PLAYING FIELD

371

court explained that an “FMLA plaintiff arguing for eligibility by estoppel
must have some evidence permitting a finder of fact to conclude that the
employee relied on the erroneous representation of eligibility.”62
Unfortunately, most of the foregoing courts have refused to allow public
employees in similar circumstances to raise the shield of equitable estoppel
in FMLA eligibility disputes.
2. Equitable Estoppel: FMLA and the Government
Historically, sovereign immunity has prevented individuals from
estopping the federal government, states, municipalities, or other
governmental entities.63 Drawing on English common law, the founding
fathers “considered immunity from private suit central to sovereign
dignity.”64 As the legendary William Blackstone explained it, “the law
ascribes to the king the attribute of sovereignty, or pre-eminence . . . [h]ence
it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the king, even in civil
matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him. For all
jurisdiction implies superiority of power.”65 In the United States, the
Supreme Court has held that sovereign immunity applies to suits seeking
either monetary damages or injunctive relief.66
In short, even though facts exist that may support the use of
equitable estoppel between individuals, government “may not be subject to
an estoppel against the assertion of its rights, when it has not consented to
their defeat.”67 However, the Supreme Court, generally holding firm to the
foregoing principle, has not completely barred the use of estoppel against
the government in certain unforeseen circumstances.68 For the most part,
lower courts have followed the general rule, but not without hinting at the
latent ambiguity associated with it.69
In Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc.,
the Court explained that the primary reason estoppel may not lie against the
government is because the misconduct of government agents should not
override society’s interest in ensuring that “obedience to the rule of law is

62

Id. at 559.
Vartanian, supra note 46, at 1; see also Utah Power & Light Co. v. U.S., 243 U.S. 389, 409
(1917); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1981).
64
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).
65
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *234-35 (1765).
66
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996).
67
Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Exeter, 90 N.H. 472, 495-96 (1940).
68
Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60-61 (1984).
69
See generally Lucas Outdoor Adver., LLC v. City of Crawfordsville, 840 N.E.2d 449, 455 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2006) (finding that generally, governmental entities are not subject to estoppel; however, in
some circumstances, government entities may be estopped). See also Barr v. Galvin, 584 F. Supp. 2d
316, 320 (D. Mass. 2008) (explaining that circumstances in which equitable estoppel may be asserted
against the government are rare and extraordinary), summary judgment granted, 659 F. Supp. 2d 225,
230 (D. Mass. 2009).
63

Published by eCommons, 2010

372

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

not undermined.”70 However, the Court opined that the government’s
interest in enforcing “the law free from estoppel might be outweighed by the
countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum standard of decency,
honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Government,” leaving open
the possibility that estoppel may be used against the government in the
future. 71 The Court stated, albeit in dictum, that “affirmative misconduct”
by government agents may lead to the allowance of estoppel.72 The Court
retreated from its statements in Heckler in a subsequent opinion in which it
concluded that allowing equitable estoppel would undercut the policy aims
of the law at issue.73
In Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, a man received
false information from a government official as to what his limit was on
earnings that would disqualify him for a disability annuity and, as a result,
he lost six months worth of disability benefits.74 Although the Court
stopped short of holding that no case existed which would allow for estoppel
of the government, it determined that misstatements by government agents
“cannot grant [a] respondent a money remedy that Congress has not
authorized.”75 In declining to apply the doctrine of estoppel against the
government, the Court indicated that such a decision might open the
floodgates to a cascade of litigation.76 Moreover, the Court declared that if
Congress “wishes to recognize claims for estoppel, it knows how to do so,
as it has done by statute in the past.”77
Applying this precedent to an FMLA eligibility dispute, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals did not allow a public school employee to assert
equitable estoppel against the government, though it acknowledged that she
may have been permitted to use the shield against a private employer.78 In
Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough Regional School District, a public school
employee claimed she was informed multiple times that she was eligible for
FMLA leave.79 She was thereafter fired for taking leave, and thus instituted
an FMLA retaliation claim.80 However, her employer argued that she was
never eligible for FMLA leave and therefore could not maintain a cause of
action under the statute.81

70

Heckler, 467 U.S. at 60.
Id. at 60-61.
Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough Reg’l Sch. Dist., 576 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Heckler, 467
U.S. at 60).
73
Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424 (1990).
74
Id. at 416.
75
Id. at Syl. ¶ (b).
76
Id. at 433.
77
Id. at Syl. ¶ (b).
78
Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough Reg’l Sch. Dist., 576 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2009).
79
Id. at 2-3.
80
Id. at 2.
81
Id. at 4.
71
72
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Although the First Circuit Court indicated that “some mechanism
should exist for employees to get rulings on whether they are entitled to
FMLA leave,” it did not allow the plaintiff to implement equitable estoppel
based upon Supreme Court precedent.82 Indeed, the court seemed conflicted
with its decision, opining that the use of equitable estoppel, though a “crude
tool for making the needed policy choices and marking out limits,” would
“have its attractions” in certain instances.83 Nevertheless, it ultimately
concluded that the Supreme Court forbade such a course of action, and that
allowing estoppel to lie in the case at hand “would be tantamount to
allowing it in the mine run of cases.”84
Given the rigidity of the foregoing precedent, several influential
judges have voiced their opinions that government should take responsibility
for its affirmative misrepresentations. One former U.S. Supreme Court
Justice argued:
[o]ur Government should not, by picayunish haggling over
the scope of its promise, permit one of its arms to do that
which, by any fair construction, the Government has given
its word that no arm will do. It is no less good morals and
good law that the Government should turn square corners in
dealing with the people than that the people should turn
square corners in dealing with their Government.85
Similarly, the Supreme Court explained in a different context, that
“men naturally trust in their government, and ought to do so, and they ought
not to suffer for it.”86
In the aforementioned Nagle opinion, the dissent asserted that
FMLA eligibility disputes offer the ideal opportunity to allow a public
employee to prevent the government from raising an eligibility defense
because the FMLA does not prevent employers from granting more
generous leave policies. Therefore, the use of estoppel does not violate the
policy aims of the statute.87 The dissenting judge also argued that repeated
assurances by a school administrator that an employee could take FMLA
leave, for which that employee is not eligible, is the type of “affirmative
misconduct” by a government official the Supreme Court requires for an

82

Id. at 6.
Id.
84
Id. at 10.
85
St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
86
Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 500 (1859); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 15455 (1972); Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 386 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing
that “one should not . . . have to employ a lawyer to see [if] his own government is issuing him a policy
which in case of loss would turn out to be no policy at all.”).
87
See Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough Reg’l Sch. Dist., 576 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2009) (Lipez, J.,
dissenting).
83
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estoppel claim to lie.88
Incidentally, courts have allowed the shield of equitable estoppel in
other disputes involving various federal laws.89 Not long ago, in In re M &
S Grading, Inc., a group of union workers filed a Chapter 11 administrative
expense claim in the amount of $559,533.55 for delinquent Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) plan contributions against the
estate of their bankrupt employer and the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”).90 The IRS maintained a $1,108,047.15 claim in post-petition
employment taxes, interest, and penalties.91 There was not enough money in
the estate to cover the full amount of either claim.92 The IRS then filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.93
The union argued that the IRS’s administrative claim should have
been subordinated to its claim under the doctrines of equitable subordination
and equitable estoppel.94 The union’s primary argument focused on the fact
that the IRS had affirmatively misrepresented, by court order, that it would
collect the tax monies due from the employees’ paychecks.95 The union
contended that it detrimentally relied on the IRS’s promise to collect the tax
monies via paycheck, thus it now had to battle the IRS’s huge claim.96
The District Court denied the United States’ motion to dismiss, and
found that while the union faced a difficult path to showing that the IRS’s
conduct “should lead to equitable subordination or equitable estoppel of its
claim, the allegations in the complaint [were] sufficient ‘to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.’”97 In allowing the equitable claims to
move forward, the court pointed to Office of Personnel Management v.
Richmond, stating that “the ability of a litigant to assert equitable estoppel
against the Government is an open question.”98
C. The Failure of 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d)
The DOL has struggled to implement equitable principles into
FMLA regulations. A prior DOL regulation made an employee eligible for
FMLA leave if his or her employer either failed to timely advise him or her
88

Id. at 9 n.10 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
See W. Fulton Broemer, Equitable Estoppel in ERISA Benefit Claims, BROEMER & ASSOCS.,
http://www.broemerlaw.com/articles/Estoppel%20in%20ERISA%20Litigation.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,
2011).
90
Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Eng’rs Health & Welfare Benefit Plan v. IRS (In re M & S
Grading, Inc.), A09-8056-TJM, No. BK02-81632-TJM, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1258, at *1, *4 (Bankr. D.
Neb. Apr. 8, 2010).
91
Id.
92
Id. at *1.
93
Id. at *2-3.
94
Id. at *5.
95
Id. at *7.
96
Id.
97
Id. at *10.
98
Id. at *16 (citing Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 423 (1990)).
89
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of eligibility or inaccurately determined that he or she was eligible for
leave.99 Under this regulation, employers could not “subsequently challenge
the employee’s eligibility.”100 However, several courts invalidated the
regulation because it exceeded the DOL’s “rulemaking powers by making
eligible under the FMLA employees who do not meet the statute’s clear
eligibility requirements.”101
Applying the now famous Chevron test for administrative
rulemaking, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.110(d) “impermissibly widen[ed] the statutory definition of an
eligible employee.”102 The court found that the FMLA was clear on the
issue of eligibility in that it only provided leave to those who had worked at
least 1,250 hours in the past twelve months.103 Continuing with that
reasoning, a Minnesota district court opined that “[t]he regulation is
essentially a rewriting of the statute.”104
However, one Ohio district court determined that the regulation was
a permissible interpretation of the FMLA.105 That court found that the
regulation did no more than reiterate the expressed intent of Congress when
it passed the law to balance the needs of family and the workplace.106 Since
Congress had not expressed a clear intent contrary to the regulation, the
court moved on to the second part of the Chevron test and upheld the
regulation, determining that it was not arbitrary or capricious.107
The Supreme Court heard its first FMLA case in 2002.108 In
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., the Court invalidated 29 C.F.R. §
825.700(a), which penalized an employer for failing to designate an
employee’s leave as FMLA leave.109 Per the regulation, if an employer
failed to designate leave as FMLA leave then the leave did not count
towards an employee’s FMLA entitlement.110 The Court invalidated the
regulation because it required employers to provide more than twelve weeks
99

29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) (1995).
Id. (revised in 2009) (many of the cases holding that this section of the regulation overstepped the
authority of the DOL were decided between 2000 and 2003, but the DOL did not revise the language of
this section until 2009).
101
Woodford v. Cmty. Action of Greene Cnty., Inc., 268 F.3d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 2001); see also
Brungart v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 796-97 (11th Cir. 2000); Dormeyer v. Comerica
Bank-Ill., 223 F.3d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 2000).
102
Id. at 55. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Chevron analysis for reviewing administrative regulations
requires a court to determine: (a) whether Congress has spoken directly to the question at issue, and if so,
the regulation may not contradict it; but (b) if the regulation is silent or ambiguous on the issue the court
must decide whether the agency’s interpretation is based on a reasonable construction of the law.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
103
Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 582.
104
Scheidecker v. Arvig Enters., Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1045 (D. Minn. 2000).
105
Miller v. Defiance Metal Prods., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 945, 948 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86 (2002).
109
29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a) (1995).
110
Id.
100
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of leave in a twelve-month period.111 Although the Court “did not invalidate
the notice and designation provisions in the regulations, it made clear that
any categorical penalty for a violation of such requirements set forth in the
regulations would exceed the [DOL’s] statutory authority.”112 The Supreme
Court reasoned that this regulation constituted too high a penalty for an
employer because the employee did not have to show the violation somehow
interfered with his or her FMLA leave.113 However, the Court also reasoned
that if an employer interfered with an employee’s FMLA rights, he or she
may be able to show damages under his or her statutory rights.114
Nevertheless, even though most federal courts determined that §
825.110(d) fundamentally altered the clear eligibility requirements of the
FMLA, several still permitted a wronged employee to use the common law
shield of equitable estoppel against his or her employer.115 More
specifically, when an employer either failed to inform an employee of his or
her eligibility, or inaccurately informed the employee she was eligible, some
courts allowed the employee the use of equitable estoppel.116 As previously
discussed, a variety of courts continued this trend and permitted employees
to use the shield of equitable estoppel on a case-by-case basis.117
D. 29 C.F.R. § 825.300 as an Administrative Solution
Six years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Ragsdale, the DOL
proposed several changes to § 825.110.118 Similar to § 825.700(a), the DOL
reasoned that § 825.110(d) “may result in an employee who is not eligible
for FMLA leave being ‘deemed eligible’ based on the employer’s lack of (or
incorrect) notice to the employee.”119 As a result, the DOL decided to delete
the “deemed eligible” provisions in both paragraphs (c) and (d) of §
825.110.120 The DOL explained that:
[i]n light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ragsdale, the
Department believes that it does not have regulatory
authority to deem employees eligible for FMLA leave who
do not meet the 12-month/1,250-hour requirements, even
where the employer fails to provide the required eligibility
111

Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 84.
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 7,876, 7,887 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 825).
113
Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 96.
114
Id. at 89.
115
See, e.g., Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., 274 F.3d 706, 723-25 (2d. Cir. 2001).
116
Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Ill., 223 F.3d 579, 582 (2000).
117
See Minard v. ITC Deltacom Commc’ns, Inc., 447 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2006); Duty v. NortonAlcoa Proppants, 293 F.3d 481, 493-94 (8th Cir. 2002); Kosakow, 274 F.3d at 723-25; Kesler v. Barris,
Scott, Denn, & Driker, No. 04-40235, 2008 WL 1766667, at *10 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
118
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 7,876, 7,882-83 (Feb. 11, 2008) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 825).
119
Id.
120
Id. at 67,942.
112
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notices to employees or provides incorrect information.121
In light of this determination, the DOL transferred the notice
provisions from § 825.110(d) to § 825.300(b).122 In addition, the DOL
changed the remedy provision for an improper notice violation.123 Under §
825.300(e), the DOL required that an employee show “individualized harm”
resulting from an employer’s interference with an employee’s FMLA
rights.124 If the employee showed such an interference or denial, then he or
she “is entitled to the remedies provided by the statute.”125
In indicating that public employees should have a means of getting
firm rulings on whether or not they are eligible for FMLA leave, the Nagle
court opined that perhaps 29 C.F.R. § 825.300 might provide the necessary
recourse, even though it did not apply to that case.126 However, even if the
Regulation failed to remedy the notice/eligibility problem with the FMLA,
the Court determined that it did “suggest that statutory or administrative
solutions can be crafted.”127 By the same token, the Supreme Court has
deferred to Congress to formulate remedies for statutory problems.128
The new regulation first emphasizes the importance of employers
responding quickly to employee requests for notification regarding their
rights and responsibilities under the FMLA.129 It next outlines a specific
process by which employers should handle designation notice.130 Lastly, it
provides consequences for employers who fail to provide timely notice,
including but not limited to “appropriate equitable or other relief.”131 This
language is similar to what is found in ERISA, which also provides for
equitable relief.132
The extent to which the changes to 29 C.F.R. § 825.300 affect cases
where an employee has received assurances regarding eligibility is still
largely uncertain. As previously mentioned, the notice regulations changed
significantly between 2008 and 2009.133 Whereas the old notice regulation
listed very general notice requirements for employers, the new regulation
added multiple sections in an apparent attempt to ameliorate the previous
121

Id.
Id. at 7,876, 7,883.
29 C.F.R. § 825.300(e) (2009).
124
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. at 7,883.
125
Id.
126
Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough Reg’l Sch. Dist., 576 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing 29 C.F.R. §
825.300(d) (2009)).
127
Id.
128
Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, Syl. ¶ (b) (1990).
129
29 C.F.R. § 825.300(c)(5) (2009).
130
Id. at § 825.300(d).
131
Id. at § 825.300(e). See also id. at § 825.400 (this enforcement provision of the FMLA
regulations also authorizes the courts to use equitable relief in remedying wrongs associated with FMLA
leave disputes).
132
See Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., 547 U.S. 356, 363 (2006).
133
See 29 C.F.R. § 825.300 (1995).
122
123
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version’s obvious deficiencies.134 However, in promulgating the new rule,
the DOL clearly indicated that it did not believe it had the statutory authority
to grant FMLA leave to those who did not meet the statutory
requirements.135 Contrary to the Nagle Court’s reasoning, that the new
regulation may have helped the plaintiff in that case, the DOL’s
interpretation could serve as a warning that § 825.300 will not assist
wronged public employees who do not otherwise meet the statutory
requirements for FMLA leave.
Clearly there is a major disconnect in how the FMLA applies to
private and public employees in notice/eligibility disputes. Indeed, it is
highly unlikely that Congress intended the law to work differently for
private and public employees who are in the same or similar circumstances.
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Ragsdale, however, that is exactly
what has occurred with the implementation of equitable estoppel in private
cases, but not in cases involving the government.
III. ANALYSIS/SOLUTION
Ideally, Congress and/or the DOL would work together to craft a
remedy to the problem of assurances of FMLA coverage as it applies to all
employees. Even though the DOL has worked to address this issue, its
attempts thus far have failed.136 Therefore, courts should be less
apprehensive about allowing wronged government employees to use the
shield of equitable estoppel when they have been misled by an employer
regarding FMLA eligibility. Allowing equity to right this wrong does not
violate the law, and it is also consistent with the language and the policy
aims of the statute.137
A. Administrative/Legislative Remedy
A meaningful administrative and/or legislative remedy is needed for
public employees seeking redress for relying on assurances of FMLA
coverage. As previously mentioned, it is unclear to what extent 29 C.F.R. §
825.300 addresses this problem.138 The new regulation may help alleviate
the issue, but it does not directly address the problem.139 Although it allows
for equitable relief, it is unlikely this broad language will persuade courts to
allow equitable estoppel to lie against the government when mandatory
authority generally forbids it.140
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

29 C.F.R. § 825.300 (2009).
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 67,942-43 (Nov. 17, 2008).
29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) (1995).
See 29 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (2006).
See 29 C.F.R. § 825.300 (2009). But cf. 29 C.F.R. § 825.300 (1995).
See 29 C.F.R. § 825.300 (2009).
Id. See also Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough Reg’l Sch. Dist., 576 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2009).
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Although the Regulation has consequences for interference with an
employee’s FMLA rights, he or she likely has no substantive rights under
the statute if an employer mistakenly offers assurance of FMLA
eligibility.141 In interpreting the Court’s decision in Ragsdale, the DOL
determined that it lacked the regulatory authority to confer benefits on
employees not expressly enumerated in the FMLA.142 As a result, since the
statute and regulations only expressly protect those employees that meet the
statutory requirements for leave, it is quite possible that the DOL simply
lacks the power to effectively protect ineligible public employees who
reasonably rely on the erroneous FMLA assurances of their employers.143 In
fact, the new remedy provision which addresses an employer’s failure to
provide proper notice of eligibility under the statute is limited to
circumstances where an employee shows that his or her employer “interferes
with, restrains, or denies the employee of his or her FMLA rights . . . .”144
Because the DOL believes that it lacks the authority to confer FMLA
benefits on an employee who does not meet the statutory requirements, it is
unlikely that § 825.300 will solve the problem at hand.
Based on this reasoning, and since courts are loathe to estop the
government, Congress and/or the DOL need to draft a legislative or
administrative solution that specifically addresses this problem. As the
Supreme Court has explained, the elements of equitable estoppel should be
incorporated into either the FMLA and/or the appropriate section of the
C.F.R. Such affirmative action would allow courts to simply point to
statutory language to protect wronged employees instead of relying on
equity.145 This proposed regulation would remedy the current situation in
which the shield of equitable estoppel is at the disposal of private but not
public employees in FMLA disputes. However, such a solution may prove
difficult to enact because a previous attempt to penalize employers for such
misrepresentations was held to improperly broaden the aims of the statute,
and also caused many courts to conclude that the DOL had overstepped its
regulatory authority.146
As previously discussed, the DOL determined that the Ragsdale
decision barred it from conferring any FMLA benefits on ineligible
employees. The latent difficulty with the issue at hand is that while the
141
Nagle, 576 F.3d at 10 (holding that a public employee has no recourse under the FMLA for
misrepresentations of eligibility by her employer); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) (1995).
142
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 67,942-43 (Nov. 17, 2008).
143
See Nagle, 576 F.3d at 8 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]here would be nothing untoward
about requiring the district to follow through on its assurances of FMLA--‘type’ protection -notwithstanding the statute’s eligibility requirements -- because no law or policy forecloses the district
from making such a promise.”).
144
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 7,876, 7,883 (Nov. 17, 2008) (emphasis
added).
145
Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, Syl. ¶ (b) (1990).
146
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 96 (2002); see also Campbell, supra note
19, at 1090, 1099.
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FMLA maintains minimum requirements for employee leave, it does not
prevent individual employers from granting broader benefit packages.147
Normally, courts that disallow the use of equitable estoppel against the
government simply explain that “those who deal with the Government are
expected to know the law and may not rely on the conduct of Government
agents contrary to law.”148 However, that reasoning is inapplicable in the
FMLA eligibility context because the statute does not limit the extent of
coverage—it merely sets a baseline of minimum requirements.
Certainly, a clearer legislative or administrative solution would
address some of the criticisms leveled at the FMLA. More specifically, if
the elements of equitable estoppel are proven in a given case, the inability of
an employer to raise ineligibility as a defense may decrease litigation
costs.149 Moreover, if courts are able to apply the doctrine of equitable
estoppel in disputes between private parties, there would be nothing
unlawful about implementing those elements in the current regulations. On
the other hand, the failure of the DOL to solve this problem over the last
seventeen years, coupled with its belief that it lacks the regulatory authority
to confer benefits not authorized by the law, could make an administrative
solution all but impossible.
Hence, it is unlikely that 29 C.F.R. § 825.300 will effectively
remedy the issue at hand. Although the regulation provides for equitable
relief in a general sense, that provision only applies if the employee shows
that his or her employer interfered with his or her FMLA rights.150 Based on
the DOL’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ragsdale, an
ineligible employee has no right to FMLA benefits.151 Unfortunately, the
DOL has effectively shackled itself from solving this conflict between
private and public employees. Consequently, since an administrative
remedy does not seem possible, public employees are left with the herculean
task of trying to convince courts that their plight represents one of those rare
instances where estoppel should lie against the government. Unless
Congress amends the FMLA to allow for the conferral of benefits in
circumstances where an employee reasonably relies on his or her employer’s
faulty notice of eligibility, then it is unlikely that a legislative or
administrative solution to this problem exists.

147
See 29 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (“[n]othing in [the FMLA] or any amendment made by this Act shall be
construed to supersede any provision of any State or local law that provides greater family or medical
leave rights than the rights established under this Act or any amendment made by this Act.”).
148
Falcone v. Pierce, 864 F.2d 226, 230-31 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of
Crawford Cnty., 467 U.S. 51, 63 (1984)).
149
See Lichtman, supra note 33, at 9B.
150
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934, 67,942-43 (Nov. 17, 2008).
151
Id. at 67,942.
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B. Common-Law Solution
Alternatively, courts should be less apprehensive in allowing
equitable estoppel to shield the government in FMLA notice/eligibility cases
for two reasons. First, the statute does not prohibit employers from
conveying broader benefits packages than what is provided for in the law.152
As a result, an agent of the government does not violate the law when he or
she informs a public employee that the person is eligible for FMLA leave.153
The pertinent section of the statute states that “[n]othing in [the FMLA] or
any amendment made by this Act shall be construed to supersede any
provision of any State or local law that provides greater family or medical
leave rights than the rights established under this Act or any amendment
made by this Act.”154 Based on this language, a public employee who is
required to “turn square corners in dealing with [the] Government” is not
mistaken when he or she reasonably believes that an employer is granting
broader FMLA-type benefits.155 Such a promise is simply not at odds with
either the purpose or the language of the law.156 Because the FMLA allows
for this type of localized permutation, it is not unreasonable for a public
employee to believe that more generous leave is lawful.
Second, a misrepresentation regarding FMLA eligibility by a
government agent, authorized to make such a determination, is the type of
“affirmative misconduct” referenced by the Supreme Court.157 Although
courts have defined affirmative misconduct as “something more than
careless misstatements,” this threshold is surpassed when a public employee
is repeatedly assured of FMLA coverage.158 As former Supreme Court
Justice Robert H. Jackson reasoned, it is unworthy of our great government
that it should be held to a lesser standard than are private entities in the same
or similar circumstances.159
However, as the Supreme Court has explained, there are legitimate
reasons for not allowing estoppel to lie against the government.160 One such
reason is that courts will not allow equitable estoppel of the government
when doing so would frustrate the purpose of the law.161 Likewise, when a
government agent acts outside the scope of his or her authority, “the United
States is neither bound nor estopped by acts of its officers or agents in
152

29 U.S.C. § 2651(a).
Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough, 576 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2009) (Lipez J., dissenting).
29 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (emphasis added).
155
St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); see also
Nagle, 576 F.3d at 8.
156
See discussion supra Part II.A.
157
See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984); see also
Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 433 (1990).
158
Nagle, 576 F.3d at 5. See also Clason v. Johanns, 438 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2006).
159
See Fed. Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 386 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
160
See Vartanian, supra note 46, at 1.
161
Heckler, 467 U.S. at 60.
153
154
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entering into an arrangement or agreement to do or cause to be done what
the law does not sanction or permit.”162 As previously discussed, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity drives this reasoning.163 This concern is
inapplicable in the FMLA context, however, because the law allows public
employers to exercise discretion in awarding leave benefits.164
A second reason is that courts would not disrupt separation of
powers by allowing the use of equitable estoppel because estopping the
government from claiming an employee was ineligible for FMLA leave
does not result in the misappropriation of government funds. Because the
FMLA allows for a public employer to confer broader benefits to
employees, any costs associated with such assurances are predictable.165
Moreover, it is likely such costs were foreseen by Congress when the law
was passed, because it not only allows for broader coverage than the
statutory minimums, it actually encourages it.166 Use of estoppel would
simply put the issue of notice/eligibility to a jury to decide, as it does in
actions involving private parties.167
A third reason is that allowance of the shield of equitable estoppel
in these circumstances will result in a cascade of litigation that would
subject government to inconsistent obligations.168 This argument fails
because the vast majority of federal laws contain specific boundaries,
outside of which government agents are prohibited from acting.169 While
the FMLA provides for minimum requirements, states and localities are
actually encouraged to grant broader leave benefits.170 When such latitude
is given, citizens should have the ability to hold the government to
assurances that are not prohibited by law.
Additionally, FMLA disputes are often local and involve relatively
small amounts of money.171 Hence, this is not a situation where taxpayer
dollars would be misappropriated.172 In this context, the employee has
already taken the FMLA leave at issue, and as a result, any economic
162

Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917); see also United States v.
Guy, 978 F.2d 934, 938 (6th Cir. 1992).
163
See discussion supra Part II.B.
164
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 84 (2002).
165
See 29 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (2006).
166
Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 84 (2002).
167
See Minard v. ITC Deltacom Commc’ns Inc., 447 F.3d 352, 359 (5th Cir. 2006).
168
Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 433 (1990) (“To open the door to estoppel
claims would only invite endless litigation over both real and imagined claims of misinformation by
disgruntled citizens, imposing an unpredictable drain on the public fisc. Even if most claims were
rejected in the end, the burden of defending such estoppel claims would itself be substantial.”).
169
See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., 467 U.S. 51, 61 (1984) (finding that an
entity that received excessive Medicare benefit payments did not incur a detriment because it simply had
to return money “that it should never have received in the first place”).
170
29 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (2006).
171
See Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough Reg’l Sch. Dist., 576 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2009) (Lipez, J.,
dissenting).
172
Id. at 10.
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damage to the American taxpayer occurred before the employee was
terminated since that was when he or she was on leave.173 At this point, it is
hard to envision how keeping such an employee on the government payroll
harms the public interest.
The fourth, and perhaps strongest, reason for disallowing estoppel to
lie against the state is that it would “encroach upon the sovereignty of the
government.”174 As the Government has argued, the “United States, as
sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued.”175 Although
the U.S. Supreme Court has generally accepted this principle, it has not
eliminated the possible use of estoppel against the government.176 In
Heckler, the Court opined that:
Though the arguments the Government advances . . . are
substantial, we are hesitant, when it is unnecessary to decide
this case, to say that there are no cases in which the public
interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law
free from estoppel might be outweighed by the
countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum
standard of decency, honor, and reliability in their dealings
with their Government.177
As illustrated, FMLA eligibility disputes represent cases where the
interests of citizens outweigh the Government’s sovereign immunity. The
Statute provides employees with the opportunity to file interference or
retaliation claims against an employer. Allowing the shield of estoppel
would not create a new cause of action against governmental entities, rather
it would simply give public employees an invaluable tool in holding the
Government to its word.178 The FMLA allows for such a promise.179 The
DOL has incorporated equitable relief into its newest regulation.180 Quite
simply, there is no conceivable objection to holding government to the
standard it has set for itself.
Although the DOL may not have the authority to allow for the
conferral of FMLA benefits on otherwise ineligible employees, the resulting
landscape is untenable. The United States Supreme Court and the DOL
have effectively prevented the conferral of benefits upon ineligible public
173
Id. at 2 (the facts in Nagle indicated that the employee was not fired until after she had taken
FMLA-type leave).
174
Ford v. Bellingham, 558 P. 2d 821, 827 n.1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977).
175
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
176
Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984).
177
Id. at 60-61.
178
See Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53, 57 (9th Cir. 1970) (“To say to these appellants, ‘The joke is on
you. You shouldn’t have trusted us,’ is hardly worthy of our great government.”).
179
29 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (2006).
180
29 C.F.R. § 825.300(e) (2009).
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employees but not upon private employees.181 What is more, private
employees have found a viable alternative to the lack of an administrative
remedy by using equitable estoppel.182 As a result, private employees
maintain the ability to hold their employer accountable for incorrect notices
of eligibility, while public employees are left with no solution at all.183
Because no viable administrative remedy exists and because the government
cannot be estopped, wronged public employees must simply live with the
consequences of their employers’ mistakes; it is unfathomable to think that
this is the type of inequitable application Congress intended when it passed
the FMLA.
The federal government has recently offered financial bailouts to
auto-manufacturers, major banks, and citizens struggling with credit.184
Considering this unprecedented generosity, it is ironic that it would provide
less protection under an existing law to its own employees. In the FMLA
notice/eligibility context, the government is not protecting itself from suit,
the age-old reasoning for sovereign immunity, and its position is at odds
with one of the express purposes of the FMLA.185 The federal courts should
not allow governmental entities to assert sovereign immunity as a defense in
circumstances where its use is inappropriate, at best.186 To be frank, citizens
should expect more from their government.
Therefore, courts should begin allowing public employees seeking
redress for assurances of FMLA coverage to use the shield of equitable
estoppel. A workable solution is not complicated; the Supreme Court in fact
identified it in Heckler. Under federal law, equitable estoppel would
prevent the government from maintaining an ineligibility defense where: (1)
it has made a misrepresentation of fact with reason to believe that a public
employee will rely upon it; (2) the employee reasonably relied on the
misrepresentation; and (3) suffered a detriment as a result.187

181
Compare Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 96 (2002) (prohibiting the
conferral of benefits on public employees), with Minard v. ITC Deltacom Commc’ns, Inc., 447 F.3d 352,
358 (5th Cir. 2006) (allowing the conferral of benefits on private employees).
182
See, e.g., Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., 274 F.3d 706, 723-25 (2d Cir. 2001).
183
The Ragsdale Court concluded that the DOL lacked the authority to confer FMLA benefits upon
an otherwise ineligible employee. Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 96. Therefore, whatever remedy 29 C.F.R. §
825.300(e) provides to ineligible public employees who receive faulty notice, it is clear that she is not
entitled to the FMLA promised. Id. However, a private employee who is able to satisfy the elements of
equitable estoppel is entitled to such a benefit. See, e.g., Minard, 447 F.3d at 359 n.36 (citing Kosakow,
274 F.3d at 724-25) (“affirming the district court’s decision to estop an employer from asserting an
affirmative defense challenging an employee’s FMLA eligibility when the employer’s unintentional
misleading behavior caused the employee to justifiably and detrimentally rely on the FMLA leave”).
Therefore, whatever remedy § 825.300(e) provides to ineligible public employees, it is certainly a vastly
weaker tool than equitable estoppel.
184
JOE SCARBOROUGH, THE LAST BEST HOPE 9-10 (2009).
185
See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2006).
186
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
187
Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 894 (1979)).
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It is fundamentally inequitable that government employees in this
country are disadvantaged by a federal law that should provide them with at
least as much protection as it provides to their private-sector counterparts.
Until this inequity is remedied, a federal statute will provide public
employees less protection than it does to those in the private sector. Not
only is this reality unintended and unjust, it is inescapably ironic.
IV. CONCLUSION
The traditional concerns associated with the use of equitable
estoppel against the government do not fit squarely with the somewhat
discretionary nature of the FMLA. Allowing equitable estoppel in this
context would “not violate federal law and, indeed, advances an important
public policy . . . and it relies on more than a casual representation by a
government official.”188 Indeed, although most courts determined that the
administrative use of estoppel was improper as an impermissible broadening
of the FMLA, many of those same courts then allowed wronged individuals
to assert common law equitable estoppel.189
Government employees seeking redress for false assurances of
FMLA eligibility need assistance. As previously explained, it is unlikely
that 29 C.F.R. § 825.300 will administratively provide such assistance.190
Thus, it is imperative that courts apply their powers of equity and implement
the common law doctrine of equitable estoppel in this context.191
If courts begin to use equitable estoppel in FMLA eligibility cases,
perhaps the next public school monitor who is given FMLA-type leave to
care for a dying spouse will keep her job when her boss makes a mistake
regarding her eligibility. On that day, the FMLA will work for those
employed by the government the way it does for those in the private sector.
Clearly the FMLA was intended to balance the needs of family and the
workplace for all Americans, and it currently fails to accomplish this goal in
FMLA notice/eligibility disputes. In short, it is time to level this uneven
playing field.
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